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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

ARISTEDES FRANCISCO, as an
individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

EMERITUS CORPORATION, an
unknown corporation; BROOKDALE
SENIOR LIVING COMMUNITIES,
INC., an unknown corporation, and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CV 17-02871 VAP (SSx)

[Hon. Virginia A. Phillips, Courtroom
8A]

**AMENDED NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF**

[Filed concurrently with Declaration of
Kenneth H. Yoon; Declaration of
Joseph M. Hekmat; [Proposed] Order]

Date: April 29, 2019
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Place: Courtroom 8A

Date Filed: March 16, 2017

1 **TO THE HONORABLE COURT AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR**
2 **RESPECTIVE COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 29, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. or as soon
4 thereafter as this matter may be heard in Courtroom 8A of the above-entitled
5 Court, located at the United States Courthouse, 350 W 1st Street, 8th Floor, Los
6 Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiff Aristedes Francisco (“Plaintiff”) will, and
7 herby does, move this Court for an order (1) preliminarily approving the proposed
8 class action settlement; (2) certifying the settlement class; (3) appointing Yoon
9 Law, APC and Hekmat Law Group as Class Counsel for the settlement class, (4)
10 authorizing the mailing of the proposed class action notice; and (5) scheduling a
11 Final Approval and Fairness Hearing.

12 This motion is made on the grounds that the proposed settlement is a fair
13 and reasonable compromise of the disputed claims in this action, and it satisfies all
14 criteria for preliminary approval of a class action settlement. The motion is based
15 upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the
16 declarations filed concurrently herewith, and all papers and records on file herein.

17
18 DATED: March 25, 2019

YOON LAW, APC
HEKMAT LAW GROUP

19
20 By: /s/ Kenneth H. Yoon
21 Kenneth H. Yoon
22 Stephanie E. Yasuda
23 Joseph M. Hekmat
24 Attorneys for Plaintiff Aristedes Francisco
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 The parties have reached a proposed settlement that, if approved by the
4 Court, will fully resolve this action. Plaintiff Aristedes Francisco (“Plaintiff”), on
5 behalf of himself and the certified class, moves this Court for an order: (1)
6 preliminarily approving the proposed Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release
7 (“Settlement Agreement” or “Settlement”) and the class action settlement it
8 embodies; (2) approving the proposed notice plan and directing distribution of the
9 proposed class notice (attached as Exhibit 1 to the proposed Settlement
10 Agreement); and (3) setting a schedule for final approval.

11 The certified class consists of all current and former non-exempt employees
12 of Defendants Emeritus Corporation, Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc.,
13 and DOES 1 through 50 (“Defendants”) who worked for Emeritus Corporation in
14 California at any time from May 11, 2013, to the present, excluding those who
15 transitioned to any Brookdale entity. Plaintiff seeks approval of the proposed class
16 action settlement for the putative class for the time period from May 11, 2013
17 through July 31, 2014.¹

18 The terms of the proposed settlement are fair and are the product of serious,
19 arm’s-length negotiation. The proposed settlement is for the gross sum of
20 \$250,000 (plus Defendants’ share of payroll tax), which represents the total
21 amount payable in this settlement by Defendant, and includes without limitation
22 the Settlement Administration Costs, attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and the Class
23 Representative Enhancement Payment. The Maximum Settlement Amount is
24 exclusive of the employer’s share of payroll taxes (if any). (Settlement ¶ 2.19.)

25 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the
26 Settlement Agreement and the class action settlement it embodies, direct notice to
27

28 ¹ July 31, 2014 is the transition date where Emeritus employees were
transitioned to Brookdale, the acquiring entity.

1 the class, and schedule a final approval hearing.

2 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

3 **A. Pleadings**

4 Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants, a chain of senior living and
5 skilled nursing facilities. Plaintiff filed his complaint in the California Superior
6 Court for the County of Los Angeles on March 16, 2017. Therein, he asserted
7 various violations of California’s Labor Code and Business & Professions Code
8 premised upon the following alleged acts and omissions by Defendant: (1) failure
9 to pay all meal period wages and rest break wages, (2) failure to pay all minimum
10 and overtime wages, (3) failure to pay all wages due and owing upon termination
11 of employment, (4) failure to provide accurate wage statements, and (5) engaging
12 in unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code §17200 *et*
13 *seq.* (Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). (DE 1-1, pp. 5-17.)

14 Defendant removed the action to the District Court for the Central District
15 of California on April 14, 2017. (DE 1.) Plaintiff amended the original complaint
16 on June 1, 2017 (the First Amended Complaint or “FAC”), to plead a single UCL
17 cause of action premised upon Labor Code §§ 226.7, 510, 512, 1194 and
18 Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order No. 5-2001 (codified as
19 California Code of Regulations, title 8, §11050) and to remove allegations for
20 claims related to Labor Code §§ 203 and 226. (DE 19.) The FAC also narrowed
21 the definition of the class to employees who have not executed arbitration
22 agreements with Defendant Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc.

23 On July 14, 2017, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
24 Complaint and/or to Strike, striking those portions of Plaintiff’s UCL claim
25 premised upon Labor Code section 226.7.

26 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

27 The Parties engaged in the discovery necessary for class-certification,
28 which was set for hearing on April 2, 2019. Plaintiff’s filing deadline for his

1 motion for class certification was originally December 10, 2018. No trial date was
2 set as of the settlement date. The Court later vacated these dates based upon the
3 stipulation of the Parties. (DE 83.)

4 The discovery conducted in this action required an extensive amount of
5 time and resources expended by all counsel of record. Plaintiff propounded sets
6 of interrogatories, and requests for production of documents, which yielded
7 hundreds of pages of documents and thousands of lines of data that Plaintiff
8 analyzed through his retained expert. Plaintiff's counsel conducted a deposition
9 of Defendants' witness designated per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6).
10 Plaintiff's counsel also defended the deposition of Plaintiff. (Declaration of
11 Kenneth H. Yoon ("Yoon Decl.") ¶ 9.)

12 The discovery process necessitated an informal discovery conference and
13 formal motion practice to compel further discovery responses. (Yoon Decl. ¶ 10.)

14 **C. Settlement**

15 The Parties participated in an all-day mediation session with David A.
16 Lowe of Rudy, Exelrod, Zieff & Lowe, L.L.P. on June 28, 2018. The case did not
17 settle at that time. However, continued discussions between counsel resulted in an
18 informal compromise on November 20, 2018. A formal Settlement Agreement
19 was executed between the parties. (Yoon Decl. ¶ 11, Exhibit A.)

20 **III. SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT**

21 The Settlement Agreement, attached to the Declaration of Kenneth H. Yoon
22 as Exhibit A, provides for \$250,000 as the Maximum Settlement Amount.
23 (Settlement ¶ 2.19.) This settlement is claims made with no reversion to the
24 Defendant. (Settlement ¶ 6.10.3.) Unclaimed payments will be transmitted to the
25 California Department of Industrial Relations, which will hold the funds for that
26 class member under California's Unclaimed Property Law. (Settlement ¶ 6.11.3.)

27 The Net Settlement Amount is the balance of the Gross Settlement Amount
28 after the following are deducted:

- Attorneys' fees in an amount up to \$83,333.25 (33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount) (Settlement ¶ 6.6);
- Actual litigation costs advanced by Class Counsel not to exceed \$15,000 (*Id*);
- Settlement Administration Costs estimated to be in the amount of \$22,000.00 (Yoon Decl. ¶ 15);
- Up to \$10,000 for the Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff (Settlement ¶ 2.14);

The Settlement Class Period is defined as May 11, 2013 through July 31, 2014. (Settlement ¶ 2.6.) The Class is estimated to have approximately 2,344 members. (Settlement ¶ 2.6.)

The Net Settlement Amount will be paid out to all Settlement Class members who do not timely submit a valid and timely opt-out request. The Class Notice explains to the Class Members all the procedures for settlement, including opt-out and objection procedures. (Class Notice, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Settlement.)

Each Class Member's share shall be based on the number of pay periods worked by the total number of pay periods that every Class Member was a member of the Class during the Class Period multiplied by the Net Settlement Amount. Pay periods shall be all pay periods within which a Class Member was considered actively employed by Emeritus as a member of the Class for any length of time in California during the Class Period. Thus, any pay periods during which a Class Member was employed by Emeritus but not actively employed as a member of the Class (for example, while classified as exempt, while on a leave of absence, while outside California, etc.) are not included as pay periods. (Settlement ¶ 6.10.1.) Thus, the allocation awards greater share to those people who worked a greater part of the Class Period.

IV. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED

A. Legal Standard

A proposed settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) must be “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Stanton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). Pursuant to Rule 23(e), “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.” The purpose of Rule 23(e) is “to protect the unnamed members of the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 360196 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (quoting *In re Syncor ERISA Litig.*, 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008)).

To determine the preliminary fairness of an agreement, the Court balances “the strength of plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; [and] the presence of a governmental participant.” *Stanton*, 327 F.3d at 959, quoting *Molski v. Gleich*, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003); see also *Ching v. Siemens Industry, Inc.*, 2013 WL 6200190 at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013) (applying these factors to a preliminary approval of class settlement). Preliminary approval is appropriate if “the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible approval.” *In re Tableware Antitrust Litig.*, 484 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007)). The question for preliminary approval of a settlement is whether it is “within the range of reasonableness.” *Ross v. Trex Co., Inc.*, 2009 WL 2365865 at *3 (N.D.Cal. July 30, 2009).

The initial determination to approve or reject a proposed settlement is “committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” *Officers for Justice v. Civil*

1 *Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court’s role in evaluating
2 the proposed settlement “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a
3 reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching
4 by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as
5 a whole, is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all concerned.” *See Rodriguez v.*
6 *West Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Officers for Justice*,
7 688 F.2d at 625). In evaluating a settlement agreement, it is not the Court’s role
8 to second-guess the agreement’s terms. *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625.
9 “Rule 23(e) wisely requires court approval of the terms of any settlement of a
10 class action, but the power to approve or reject a settlement negotiated by the
11 parties before trial does not authorize the court to require the parties to accept a
12 settlement to which they have not agreed.” *Evans v. Jeff D.*, 475 U.S. 717, 726
13 (1986); *see also Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)
14 (“Neither the district court nor this court ha[s] the ability to delete, modify or
15 substitute certain provisions. The settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.”). In
16 general, there is a strong judicial policy favoring class settlements. *Class*
17 *Plaintiffs v. Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992).

18 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

19 **1. Arms’-Length Negotiations**

20 The Settlement before the Court was reached through arms’-length
21 bargaining. Each side was represented by reputable attorneys, experienced in
22 wage and hour law and class action litigation. Each side prepared their case based
23 on the extensive discovery exchanged between the parties and their own
24 independent investigations. (See Yoon Decl. ¶ 12.)

25 **2. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery**

26 As detailed above and in the Yoon Declaration (¶¶ 8-10), the Parties
27 conducted extensive discovery and investigation, including production and review
28 of salient documents, depositions, and merits-based discovery. The settlement

only came after the Parties had performed a significant amount of merits-based discovery.

3. Class Counsel's Wage and Hour Class Action Experience

Here, counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendants have a great deal of experience in wage and hour class action litigation. Plaintiff's counsel have significant and reputable histories of litigating complex cases, including wage and hour class actions, such as the present case, as discussed further *infra* in section VI (E).

This was a contentious and litigation intensive case where Plaintiff retained an expert and was working towards preparing his motion for contested class certification before reaching this tentative resolution. As noted above, Plaintiff's counsel conducted extensive investigation of the factual allegations in this case. Thus, based upon such experience and knowledge of the current case, Plaintiff's counsel believe that the current settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. In sum, there should be a presumption of fairness because the factors establishing such a presumption are satisfied.

C. The Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable

The Settlement for each participating Class Member is fair, reasonable and adequate, given the inherent risk of litigation, the risk of appeals, the risks in an area where it is argued that the law is unsettled, and the costs of pursuing such litigation. The Settlement here is within a range of reasonableness allowing for preliminary approval. Applying the rest of the factors here, the Settlement for each participating Class Member is fair, reasonable and adequate, given the inherent risk of litigation, the risk of appeals, the risks in an area where it is argued that the law is unsettled, and the costs of pursuing such litigation.

1. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable Given Maximum Potential Recovery and Accompanying Risks of Continued Litigation

To assess the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of a class action

1 settlement, the Court must weigh the immediacy and certainty of substantial
2 settlement proceeds against the risks inherent in continued litigation. *See In re*
3 *General Motors Corp.*, 55 F.3d 768, 806 (3d Cir. 1995) (“present value of the
4 damages plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, appropriately discounted for
5 the risk of not prevailing, should be compared with the amount of the proposed
6 settlement.”); *see also Girsh v. Jepson*, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975); *Boyd v.*
7 *Bechtel Corp.*, 485 F. Supp. 610, 616-17 (N.D. Cal. 1979)

8 Plaintiff’s overtime wage claims were premised upon Plaintiff’s allegation
9 that Defendant implemented an unofficial policy of requiring employees to work
10 off the clock, including for the time spent working through recorded meal periods
11 and post-liminary work.

12 Based upon the documents that Defendant produced for about 600
13 employees, Plaintiff calculated damages for time spent working through meal
14 periods as 30 minutes of unpaid time for every shift over six hours. There were
15 27,612 shifts in the data that were over six hours, of which 1,959 were over eight
16 hours and 220 were over 12 hours. Thus, Plaintiff calculated damages in the
17 amount of \$122,841.39 for unpaid straight time (25,433 shifts x 0.5 hours x
18 \$9.66), \$14,192.95 for unpaid overtime (1,959 shifts x 0.5 hours x \$14.49), and
19 \$2,125.20 for unpaid doubletime (220 shifts x 0.5 hours x \$19.32), which Plaintiff
20 calculated grossed up to a little over **\$550,000** for the Class.

21 Plaintiff estimated preliminary and postliminary overtime in the amount of
22 20 minutes for each workday, for damages in the amount of a little less than
23 **\$290,000** for the Class.

24 Plaintiff calculates damages as the difference between the amount
25 Defendant compensated employees as indicated in the paycheck paystubs and
26 what employees should have been paid had they been properly compensated based
27 on the correct workday. Plaintiff estimates this damage to total a little over
28 **\$60,000** for the Class.

1 Because of the Court's ruling on motions, there are no other damages
2 available for the exposure analysis.

3 **2. Costs and Risks of Continued Litigation**

4 Another factor considered by courts in approving a settlement is the
5 complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation. *Officers of Justice*, 688
6 F.2d at 625; *Girsh*, 521 F.2d at 157. In applying this factor, the Court must weigh
7 the benefits of the Settlement against the expense and delay involved in achieving
8 an equivalent or more favorable result at trial. *Young v. Katz*, 447 F.2d 431, 433-
9 34 (5th Cir. 1971).

10 The Settlement provides fair and prompt relief to all Class Members in lieu
11 of lengthy continued litigation. After resolution of Plaintiff's class certification
12 motion, assuming the class survived, the Parties would proceed with a class action
13 trial, estimated to take several days.

14 At trial, there exists the regular risk that the trier of fact will not find that
15 the high range of damages is warranted, but may award a lower amount of
16 damage.

17 Further, after a decision favoring the Class, Defendant would have the right
18 to appeal. Given the realities of appellate practice, this process places ultimate
19 relief several years away. The immediate and substantial recovery now, versus a
20 years-long appeal process regarding various potential issues, is a significant factor
21 to be considered. *See National Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, Nos.
22 CV 99-5666 LGB(CWX), CV 00-2117 LGB(CWX), 221 F.R.D. 523, 526-27
23 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (Baird, J.) ("Avoiding such a trial and the subsequent appeals in
24 this complex case strongly militates in favor of settlement rather than further
25 protracted and uncertain litigation.").

26 **3. Non-Admission of Liability by Defendants**

27 Plaintiff understands that Defendant denies any liability or wrongdoing of
28 any kind associated with the claims alleged in this lawsuit, and further denies that,

1 for any purpose other than that of settling this lawsuit, this action is appropriate
2 for class treatment. Defendant maintains, among other things, that they have
3 complied at all times with California wage and hour laws.

4 This denial increases the likelihood of protracted litigation.

5 **4. The Settlement is Within the Range of Reasonableness**

6 The reasonable high-end exposure estimated by Plaintiff is \$900,000 for
7 total damages. The gross settlement in the amount of \$250,000 thus accounts for
8 approximately 25-30% of the estimated exposure. Plaintiff respectfully submits
9 this not only well within the range of reasonableness, but an excellent result. *See,*
10 *e.g., William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions* § 13:15 (5th ed.
11 2016) (the range of reasonableness percentage could be as low as 1/100th or
12 1/1000th of 1%); *Ma*, 2014 WL 360196 at *5 (finding a settlement worth 9.1% of
13 the total value of the action “within the range of reasonableness”); *Balderas v.*
14 *Massage Envy Franchising, LLC*, 2014 WL 3610945, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21,
15 2014) (granting preliminary approval of a net settlement amount representing 5%
16 of the projected maximum recovery at trial); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 2007
17 WL 221862, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) *aff’d*, 331 Fed. Appx. 452 (9th Cir.
18 2009) (approving a settlement of an action claiming unpaid overtime wages where
19 the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% to 35% of the estimated
20 actual loss to the class); *Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.*, 667 F.3d 273, 325 (3rd
21 Cir. 2011) (there appears to be “no authority that requires a district court to assess
22 the fairness of a settlement in light of the potential for trebled damages.”). Further,
23 in light of Defendant’s denial of liability, the Court should discount the total value
24 of the claims to account for the risks and costs of continued litigation.
25 Accordingly, the total exposure based on Defendant’s anticipated defenses may be
26 anywhere from zero and \$900,000. (Yoon Decl. ¶ 14.)

27 **V. PLAINTIFF SEEKS APPROVAL OF THE CLASS PERIOD FOR** 28 **THE CERTIFIED CLASS**

The certified class consists of current and former nonexempt employees of

1 Defendants Emeritus Corporation, Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc.,
2 and DOES 1 through 50 (“Defendants”) who worked for Emeritus Corporation in
3 California at any time from May 11, 2013, to the present, excluding those who
4 transitioned to any Brookdale entity. Plaintiff seeks approval of the proposed class
5 action settlement for the certified class for the time period from May 11, 2013
6 through July 31, 2014.

7 **VI. CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS IS**
8 **APPROPRIATE**

9 Pursuant to the Settlement, the Parties have agreed to seek conditional
10 certification, for settlement purposes only, of a class defined as:

11 [A]ll current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants who
12 worked for Emeritus Corporation in California at any time from May
13 11, 2013 to the present, excluding those who transitioned to any
14 Brookdale entity.

15 (Settlement, at 2.3.) The Parties seek approval of the proposed class action
16 settlement for the putative class for the time period from May 11, 2013 through
17 July 31, 2014. (Settlement, at 2.6.)

18 A proposed class may be conditionally certified if it “satisfies the
19 requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to
20 all class actions, namely: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4)
21 adequacy of representation. *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1019
22 (1998). Wage-and-hour cases such as the above-captioned matter “routinely
23 proceed as class actions.” *Prince v. CLS Transp., Inc.*, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1320,
24 1328 (2004). Obviously, many such cases settle. Here, there has not yet been
25 certification of a class; that is, the Settlement was negotiated prior to the filing of a
26 motion for class certification. However, “[a] trial court unquestionably ha[s] the
27 authority to conditionally certify a class for settlement purposes.” *Hernandez v.*
28 *Vitamin Shoppe Indus. Inc.*, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1457 (2009).

1 **A. The Class is Sufficiently Numerous**

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that a class be so
3 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Numerosity does not
4 require that joinder of all members be impossible, but only that joinder be
5 impracticable. *Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.* 158 F.R.D. 439, 440
6 (N.D. Cal. 1994); *Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc.*, 329 F.2d 909, 913-
7 914 (9th Cir. 1964). In this matter, the Settlement Class includes approximately
8 2,344 members. Therefore, numerosity is easily established.

9 **B. The Class is Ascertainable**

10 The proposed class must also be ascertainable, and must identify “a distinct
11 group of plaintiffs whose members can be identified with particularity.” *Lerwill v.*
12 *Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.* 582 F. 2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). In this case, the
13 members of the proposed Settlement Class can be readily identified with
14 particularity for the following primary reasons: (1) the class definition is stated in
15 terms that are objectively easy to understand and do not require any specific
16 knowledge of Defendant’s business, (2) Defendant maintains timekeeping,
17 payroll, and other records that show the dates of employment for its non-exempt
18 employees as well as which transitioned from Emeritus to Brookdale. The
19 Settlement Class is therefore ascertainable.

20 **C. There Are Common Issues of Law and Fact**

21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) requires that there are “questions
22 of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. § 23(a)(2). For the “common
23 question” requirement to be met, “[t]he existence of shared legal issues with
24 divergent legal factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts
25 coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class if there are questions of law
26 and fact common to the class.” *Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir.
27 2003); *see also Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1019.

28 In this case and for settlement purposes only, Defendant has stipulated and

1 agreed with Plaintiff that common issues of law and fact exist. These include
2 whether Defendant maintained statewide policies and practices that did not
3 comply with California law on the payment of wages and the provision of meal
4 periods. Furthermore, all proposed class members seek damages for the same
5 alleged violations. The only difference between class members will be the
6 specific dollar amounts of recovery to which each class member is entitled, which
7 is common because individual assessment of damages is required in all class-
8 action cases. Under these circumstances, the commonality requirement is met.

9 **D. The Claims of the Named Plaintiff are Typical of the Claims of**
10 **the Class**

11 The typicality requirement is met if the claims of the named plaintiff are
12 typical of those of the class, though “they need not be substantially identical.” *See*
13 *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020; *Classen v. Weller*, 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 46-47 (1983).
14 The requirement is satisfied here, where Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same
15 alleged course of conduct that gave rise to the claims of other Class Members.
16 Specifically, Plaintiff himself is a member of the Class and he asserts that he
17 personally was not compensated for his time spent working during so-called meal
18 periods and for time spent after clocking-out at the end of each work day, because
19 he – like everyone else – was subject to the same alleged policies and procedures
20 as every other Class Member. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class as a whole
21 because they arise from the same factual basis and are based on the same legal
22 theories. Therefore the typicality requirement is readily met.

23 **E. Class Counsel and the Class Representatives are Adequate**

24 The adequacy requirement is met if the class representative and class
25 counsel have no interests adverse to the interests of the proposed class members
26 and are committed to fairly, vigorously, and competently prosecuting the case on
27 behalf of the class. *Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.*, 582 F.2d 507, 512
28 (9th Cir. 1978); *see also Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020.

1 Here, Plaintiff is an adequate class representative. Plaintiff has no conflict
2 of interest with any class member, as he has been damaged by the same alleged
3 conduct as the Class Members and has the incentive to fairly represent all Class
4 Members to achieve the maximum possible recovery. Plaintiff is committed to
5 pursuing the claims of the Class Members, and his motivation in retaining counsel
6 and pursuing this action has solely been to collect the amount owed for himself
7 and his fellow Class Members. Plaintiff is fully informed of his duties as a class
8 representative and is further aware that he surrendered any right to compromise
9 the group action for his own individual gain. Plaintiff has taken the time to be an
10 active participant in this action, including sitting for his deposition on November
11 28, 2017.

12 Furthermore, Plaintiff is represented by counsel who have extensive
13 experience in complex wage-and-hour litigation and have protected the interests
14 of the Class Members. The qualifications of class counsel—Kenneth Yoon,
15 Stephanie Yasuda, and Joseph Hekmat—are set forth in the accompanying Yoon
16 Declaration. Those qualifications should assure the Court that the interests of the
17 unnamed Class Members will be adequately and vigorously represented, and that
18 proposed class counsel will adequately discharge its responsibilities to the class.
19 (Yoon Decl. ¶¶ 16-21.)

20 Accordingly, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are adequate and will continue
21 to fairly and adequately represent the Class.

22 **F. The Class Action Method is the Superior Means of Adjudication**

23 Class actions are the superior method of adjudication when they unify
24 claims that would otherwise require adjudication of numerous separate actions
25 arising out of the same basic facts. *See Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal. App.
26 4th 1286, 1308 (2010) (“[i]n light of the numerous common issues of fact and law
27 that predominate in this lawsuit, we conclude that proceeding by way of class
28 action is the superior method of adjudication”); *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v.*

1 *Superior Court*, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326 (2004) (“As alleged, each class member’s
2 claim to unpaid overtime depends on whether he or she worked for defendant
3 during the relevant period in a position that was misclassified “). Further, there
4 is recognition by the courts that class actions are encouraged where “absent
5 effective enforcement, the employer’s cost of paying occasional judgments and
6 fines may be significantly outweighed by the cost savings of not paying
7 overtime.” *Gentry v. Superior Court*, 42 Cal. 4th 443, 462 (2007).

8 Here, the numerous common issues of law and fact that predominate in this
9 case make class treatment the superior method of adjudication. Plaintiff’s claims
10 are based on the same system-wide policies, procedures, and practices that apply
11 to all Class Members. This class action will serve to deter further unlawful
12 employment practices on the part of Defendant. The wage-and-hour claims of the
13 class members are difficult to prosecute as individual employees because (1)
14 many of the individual claims are likely to be relatively low-value and may need
15 to be litigated in small claims court, and (2) these employees are likely to be
16 unaware of their right to meal periods or rest breaks, particularly because it is
17 common in the delivery industry for companies to deny employees meal periods
18 and rest breaks during peak hours.

19 For all these reasons, a class action is the superior means of resolving
20 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ claims and this action should be certified
21 accordingly.

22 **VII. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS** 23 **OF DUE PROCESS**

24 The proposed notice (Exhibit 1 to the Settlement Agreement) complies with
25 due process and Rule 23. Under Rule 23(e), the court “must direct notice in a
26 reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the propos[ed
27 settlement].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1). Class members are entitled to receive “the
28 best notice practicable under the circumstances.” *Wright v. Linkus Enter., Inc.*,
259 F.R.D. 468, 475 (E.D. Cal. 2009), quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2). Notice is

1 satisfactory if it “generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail
2 to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be
3 heard.” *Churchill Vill., L.L.C. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting
4 *Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980). In
5 addition, notice that is mailed to each member of a settlement class “who can be
6 identified through reasonable effort” constitutes reasonable notice. *Eisen v.*
7 *Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974); *see also Eddings v. Health Net,*
8 *Inc.*, 2013 WL 169895 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013) (finding that the parties’
9 plan for notice by first-class mail met the “best practicable notice” standard where
10 the settlement administrator would take steps such as database searches to ensure
11 that class members’ addresses were current and would re-mail returned notices).

12 The Settlement provides that the Settlement Administrator will send by first
13 class mail a copy of the court-approved notice to all Class Members. (Settlement
14 ¶ 6.3.) Class Members will have forty-five (45) days from the date of the initial
15 mailing to object or request exclusion. (Settlement ¶ 2.11.) There is no
16 requirement to file a claim to be paid; the administration of the settlement
17 payments to Class Members is an automatic process. (Settlement at ¶ 6.10.3.) The
18 Class Notice provides Class Members with information as to how they may be
19 paid for their respective proportionate shares of the Net Settlement Amount.
20 (Settlement Ex. 1.) In the event a Notice Packet is returned undeliverable, the
21 Settlement Administrator will make reasonable efforts to obtain a valid mailing
22 address by using the social security number of the class member and standard skip
23 tracing devices to conduct a search for a correct mailing address. (Settlement ¶
24 6.3.2.)

25 The Class Notice provides the Class everything they need to know in order
26 to make an informed decision. It provides an explanation of the proposed
27 Settlement and procedures on how to object and appear. The documentation
28 provides a brief explanation of the case, the exclusion date and procedure for

1 exclusion, the attorney's fees to be paid and the individual members' estimated
2 recovery under the Settlement net of expenses, which are all included in the notice
3 papers. It also states that those who do not opt out will be bound by the
4 Settlement. (Yoon Decl. Ex. A-1.) Additionally, the settlement release is broader
5 than the certified claims, and the notice will give Class Members the opportunity
6 to evaluate the settlement release and choose to either participate and opt-out of
7 the action.

8 The estimated sum for Settlement Administration Costs is \$22,000.00.
9 (Yoon Decl. ¶ 15.)

10 **VIII. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT IS REASONABLE**

11 Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement, Defendants agreed not to oppose an
12 enhancement payment to the Class Representative of \$10,000, which Plaintiff
13 requests this Court preliminarily approve.

14 It is appropriate to provide a payment to a class representative for his or her
15 services to the class. *Van Vracken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 901 F.Supp. 294, 299
16 (N.D. Cal. 1995); *Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc.*, 231 F.R.D. 602, 614 (C.D.
17 Cal. 2005) ("Proceeding by means of a class action avoids subjecting each
18 employee to the risks associated with challenging an employer"); *Bogosian v. Gulf*
19 *Oil Corp.*, 621 F.Supp. 27, 32 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

20 Incentive awards for representative plaintiffs are both proper and routine.
21 For example, in *Enterprise Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transp. Corp.*, 137
22 F.R.D. 240, 250-51 (S.D. Ohio 1991), each representative plaintiff was granted a
23 \$50,000.00 incentive award. Also, the class representatives in *In re Dunn &*
24 *Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig.*, 130 F.R.D. 366, 377 (S.D. Ohio 1990),
25 received incentive awards ranging from \$35,000.00 to \$55,000.00. Because a
26 named plaintiff is an essential ingredient of any class action, an incentive award is
27 appropriate to induce individuals to step forward and assume the burdens and
28 obligations of representing the class. In deciding the amount of an enhancement

1 award for a class representative, relevant factors include the actions the plaintiff
2 has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has
3 benefited from those actions and the amount of time and effort the plaintiff
4 expended in pursuing the litigation. *See Cook v. Niedert*, 142 F.3d 1004, 1015 (7th
5 Cir. 1998); *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294, 299-300
6 (N.D. Cal. 1995); *Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.*, 621 F. Supp. 27, 32 (E.D. PA
7 1985).

8 Particularly in employment class actions, such as discrimination or wage
9 claims, named plaintiffs should be entitled to an enhancement award as an
10 incentive to take the risks associated with pursuing employment claims on behalf
11 of other employees. An award is justified where the plaintiff is a “present or past
12 employee whose present position or employment credentials or recommendation
13 may be at risk by reason of having prosecuted the suit, who therefore lends his or
14 her name and efforts to the prosecution of litigation at some personal peril.”
15 *Roberts v. Texaco*, 979 F. Supp. 185, 201 (S.D.N.Y 1997).

16 The amount sought by Plaintiff is warranted in this case. Mr. Francisco was
17 actively involved in this case during the entire litigation. He spent time searching
18 for documents, contacting Class Counsel to discuss the status of the case
19 approximately once every two weeks, preparing and appearing for deposition,
20 poring over the details of the settlement agreement and speaking with co-workers
21 regarding the case. Mr. Francisco has been the name and face for this litigation
22 from the outset. Hundreds of people know he started this case. With respect to the
23 work he performed, Plaintiff’s counsel held conference calls with him on more
24 than a dozen occasions pre-filing and post-filing to update him on the case and to
25 interview him for additional details; he also met with Plaintiff’s counsel to prepare
26 for his deposition (more than once in person and several times over the phone) and
27 to go over complicated documents such as the settlement agreement. (Declaration
28 of Joseph M. Hekmat (“Hekmat Decl.”) ¶ 14.)

1 In addition, Plaintiff ran the risk of not prevailing in this matter and thereby
2 facing a cost bill. This is a real risk that Plaintiff assumed at his own expense
3 alone for the benefit of the Class – a risk that the other members of the Class did
4 not have to face in order to get the benefits of this Settlement. This risk is
5 substantial, and not related to his work as a plaintiff. In fact, while there is a
6 reason and risk to take this risk for oneself, it is a different and greater risk when
7 taken for thousands of others. Most people are not interested in this risk.

8 Plaintiff put his name on a public record at the risk of possible future
9 adverse employment consequences by future or potential employers who might
10 choose to not hire him because he took the lead in this lawsuit. This was a
11 significant risk that he has borne for the class who will reap the benefits of this
12 case without having to face this risk personally themselves. *See Roberts*, 979 F.
13 Supp. at 201. This also should be considered in the award of the Enhancement
14 Payment.

15 Perhaps most importantly, Mr. Francisco has undertaken the challenge of
16 living alone in Los Angeles while his family, including three boys, live in the
17 Philippines. He has not seen his family since approximately March 2018 and has
18 postponed his plans to return to the Philippines until after this matter has been
19 resolved so that he can be available whenever needed. This is an emotional burden
20 for Mr. Francisco, but one he insists on taking for the sake of seeing this class
21 action through to the end. (Hekmat Decl. ¶ 15.)

22 Finally, and as mentioned previously, as part of the Settlement, Plaintiff
23 was required to provide Defendant with a broader release, something that the class
24 members did not have to surrender in order to receive the benefits under this
25 Settlement.

26 The amount of \$10,000 to Plaintiff as the class representative is extremely
27 reasonable given the risks that he took on and bore for the class and the benefits
28 he conveyed on them. In doing so, he has successfully brought and maintained

1 claims that may have never been brought. Plaintiff should be compensated
2 accordingly for his individualized efforts. Any incentive award will be left entirely
3 to the determination of the Court at the time of final approval of the Settlement.
4 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the
5 enhancement award.

6 **IX. CONCLUSION**

7 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court
8 enter an order granting preliminary approval of this class action settlement.

9
10 DATED: March 25, 2019

YOON LAW, APC
HEKMAT LAW GROUP

11
12 By: /s/ Kenneth H. Yoon
13 Kenneth H. Yoon
14 Stephanie E. Yasuda
15 Joseph M. Hekmat
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